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Moving to a multi-track approach? 
Despite improved procedures at the UN-
sponsored Tripartite Talks, and new 
voices at the All-inclusive Intra East 
Timorese Dialogue (AIETD), hopes for 
progress towards peace in East Timor 
are tempered by the reality on the 
ground. With a growing number of 
people falling victim to human rights 
abuses, future peacemaking initiatives 
must involve voices from below. 
At the diplomatic level things seem to have improved for East Timor. The first round 
of Tripartite Talks under UN auspices to be 
held since Kofi Annan took over as UN 
secretary-general introduced changes in 
negotiating procedures: senior officials will in 
future meet for longer and more frequently 
and their meetings will be chaired by Annan's 
personal representative on East Timor, 
Jamsheed Marker. Meanwhile , the next 
AIETD meeting in October will include more 
representatives of women and young people. 
Hopes offurther diplomatic progress were 
aroused in July when the South African 
president, Nelson Mandela, visited the 
imprisoned Timorese resistance leader, 
Xanana Gusmao, and called on President 
Suharto to release him. Despite good relations 
between South Africa and Indonesia (bilateral 
trade between the two countries has more 
than tripled since 1993) the Indonesian 
government quickly discounted an early 
release of Gusmao. Officials said they would 
be prepared to consider it only in exchange 
for Portugal's recognition of Indonesian 
sovereignty over East Timor. Nevertheless, 
the initiative has opened up fresh discussions 
which may well be taken forward during 
Suharto 's visit to South Africa in November. 
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Deterioration 
Inside East Timor, however, things are very 
different. While Bishop Belo and Jose 
Ramos-Horta were receiving their Nobel 
peace prize late last yea r , human rights 
abuses in East Timor were multiplying . 
The first half of 1997 represented a 
'marked deterioration' in violations, 
according to the East Timor Human Rights 
Centre in Melbourne. Indeed, there seems 
little chance of change while the peace 
process remains one-dimensional, 
operating almost entire ly from the top 
down. 
Research on peace processes suggests 
that multi-track approaches , with 
simultaneous initiatives at many levels, 
work best. While the AIETD is itself an 
attempt to move beyond the ministerial 
meetings , it remains inadequate . The 
exclusion of political questions from the 
agenda bars discussion of fundamental 
issues while, despite the addition of five 
more participants, the hand-picked 
delegates do not represent the entire 
spectrum of East Timorese opinion. 
What is needed is a mechanism for 
consu ltin g far greater numbers of 
ordinary East Timorese people , 
particularly women. A peacebuilding 
in1t1ative that works from below, 
complementing the top-down approach , 
would be timely and could have a lasting 
effect, a lthough no one should 
underestimate the difficulties. 
Partnership 
Peacemaking at the diplomatic level needs 
to be supported and linked to 
peacemaking among the increasingly 
diverse population of East Timor. The 
church has the capacity to appeal to 
people for recon~iliation, and to secure it. 
It has already made some effort to do so, as 
we can see from the successive calls for 
peace and reconciliation in Bishop Belo 's 
pastoral letters. But a universally owned 
process could do much more. 
At the international level what is needed 
is a partnership encompassing the Portuguese 
and Indonesian authorities, the UN, East 
Timorese political leaders, and Indonesian 
and East Timorese religious leaders. This 
would build on and support processes at work 
at the grassroots, where any diplomatic 
agreement has to be accepted and lived out 
if it is to work. 
On 23 September this year the European 
Union defended the rights of East Timor 
as repr ese nted in UN resolutions. EU 
governments could reinforce this stance by 
calling for a broadening of discussions as a 
first stage towards achieving international 
partnership. This would also be in line 
with the EU 's Common Position on East 
Timor, which is analysed in a specia l 
supplement in this issue of Timor Link. The 
recommendations made in this paper 
might prompt stronger calls for serious 
dialogue between all concerned. • 
Summary 
This month's Timor Link is a special issue 
canying an in-depth supplement on the 
European Union's Common Position on East 
Timor, adopted in June last year. Written by 
Eilis Ward, a PhD candidate in Political 
Science at Trinity College, Dublin, 'EU Policy 
on East Timor: Fulfilling the potential of the 
Common Position' argues that the Common 
Position can provide a solid framework for 
progressive change in the region. Ward also 
makes firm recommendations for using the 
European policy to further the cause of 
peace. 
Also in this issue, we report on the 
continued deterioration in human rights in 
East Timor in the first half of this year. We 
argue that, despite improvements in the 
procedures for peace talks, a more participa-
tory approach to peacemaking is needed. 
Plus, Pat Smythe describes the Portuguese 
Catholic church's growing awareness of the 
situation in East Timor and the plight of the 
Timorese, and we review a new publication 
with shocking photographic evidence of 
torture in the territory. 
REPORT 
Groundswell 
of abuses 
Human rights abuses on the ground in 
East Timor have continued to increase 
this year, according to a new human 
rights report. 
Th e report, Human Rights Deteriorate in East Timar from the Melbourne-based 
East Timor Human Rights Centre 
(ETHRC), documents violations of human 
rights in the first half of 1997. Many of 
these were carried out by security forces 
responding to the occupation of the 
Austrian embassy in Jakarta in March, to 
demonstrations held during the visit of 
UN special representative , Jamsheed 
Marker, and during the Indonesian 
national elections in May. The report also 
documents a large number of arbitrary 
arrests and detentions, many involving 
torture and disappearances . It estimates 
that 707 people were arrested between 
January and July, twice as many as in the 
previous year , and points out that these 
arrests are usually conducted by the 
military rather than the police 
(contravening Indonesian law), that they 
are made without warrants , and that 
usually lawyers are not provided. 
The report notes that at least 40 people 
died as a result of Operasi Gerakan Tuntas 
(Operation Extermination), which aimed 
to crush Falintil (the armed East Timorese 
resistance) and the Clandestine Front 
following an increase in Falintil activity 
during the election period. Among the 
dead was David Alex, a prominent Falintil 
commander, deputy to Konis Santana, and 
leader of the resistance in the Baucau 
area . The circumstances surrounding 
Alex· s death are still unclear. 
The overall picture presented by the 
report is bleak , and efforts must be 
redoubled to persuade Indonesia to 
implement the resolution passed in April 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights 
and to permit a UN presence in East 
Tim or. 
• On 15 Mav the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention accepted evidence 
submitted bv the ETHRC and ruled that 
the arrest of a group of East Timorese in 
June 1996 had been arbitrary and 
contravened Articles 9 and 10 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
It referred the cases of three of the 
detainees to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child and called on 
Indonesia to conform to international 
standards. • 
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EAST TIMOR: Time for change 
Timor, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11August1975 the VDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was in control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia dosed West Timor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as i11egaL 
The invasion and annexation ofEast'IDnor 
has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian nde. But the majorityof'llmalw 
have notaa:eptedsubjupdomlndoamil Im 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
T11Dorese for self-determination and an anned 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutiom, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East T11Dor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Timor by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Timor, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12November1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians dming a funeral procession held at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East Tanorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz llUl8ll8Q'e 
provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
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EU Policy on East Timor 
Fulfilling the potential of the Common Position 
The European Union1 Council of Ministers adopted its first Common Position on East Timor2 on 
26 June 1996 after months of debate and years of pressure from campaigning groups in 
member states, who greeted it as a potentially useful tool. While there is a danger that EU 
institutions will use the Common Position in a limited way, Ellis WARD argues that alongside 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) statement of April 1997, it could 
provide a solid framework for progressive change. Here she analyses the content of the Common 
Position and suggests what European and other northern voluntary organisations (NVOs) can do 
to maximise its potential. 
The main part of the EU Common Position on East 
I Timor is contained in two articles: 
Article 1 
The European Union, referring to its previous 
declarations on the situation in East Timor, 
intends to pursue the following aims: 
1) to contribute to the achievement by dialogue of 
a fair, comprehensive and internationally 
acceptable solution to the question of East 
Timor, which fully respects the interests and 
legitimate aspirations of the Timorese people, 
in accordance with international law; 
2) to improve the situation in East Timor regarding 
respect for human rights in the territory. 
Article 2 
To pursue the aims referred to in Article 1, the 
European Union: 
1) supports the initiatives undertaken in the 
United Nations framework which may 
contribute to resolving this question; 
2) supports in particular the current talks under 
the aegis of the United Nations Secretary 
General with the aim of achieving the solution 
referred to in point 1) of Article 1, effective 
progress towards which continues to be 
hampered by serious obstacles; 
3) encourages the continuation of Intra-Timorese 
Dialogue meetings in the context of this 
process of dialogue under the auspices of the 
United Nations; 
4) calls upon the Indonesian government to 
adopt effective measures leading to a 
significant improvement in the human rights 
situation in East Timor. In particular by 
implementing fully the relevant decisions 
adopted in this connection by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights; 
5) supports all appropriate action with the 
objective of generally strengthening respect for 
human rights in East Timor and substantially 
improving the situation of its people, by means 
of the resources available to the European 
Union and aid for action by NGOs.3 
This paper examines how the Common Position 
came to be adopted; how significant it is; how it 
has been implemented so far; and what should be 
done if it is to be put to its maximum use. 
Eilis Ward lectures in the Department of Political Science, 
Trinity College, Dublin. She is currently researching the 
involvement of civil society in Irish foreign policy and among her 
case studies is the evolution of Irish policy towards East Timor. 
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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EAST TIMOR: 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
EU policy on East Timor has evolved slowly. The 
European Parliament never doubted that 
Indonesia was infringing international law in East 
Timor. However, it was only when internal 
pressures (from EU member states and civil 
society) and external pressures (as a result of East 
Timor's increased profile within the United 
Nations and other multilateral fora) were felt that 
a common position within the EU became 
desirable. 
There are at least three reasons why it took the 
European Union so long to develop a coherent 
policy towards East Timor. First, when Indonesia 
invaded East Timor in 1975, issues of justice and 
human rights were understood through the 
divided loyalties of the Cold War - the larger 
western powers, such as the United States, Japan 
and Australia, defended Jakarta, while the rights 
of the East Timorese were defended by the Soviet 
bloc within the United Nations. Most European 
powers remained silent and usually abstained in 
votes on the issue at the UN General Assembly. 
Second, Indonesia's role in aiding European 
countries' relations with other ASEAN (the 
Association of South East Asian Nations) states 
meant many EU members were reluctant to 
support self-determination for East Timor.4 Third, 
before Portugal joined the European Community 
in 1986 no member state had a particular interest 
in promoting the case of the East Timorese 
people. 
The Portuguese constitution, adopted after the 
197 4 revolution, obliges Portugal to 'promote and 
safeguard the right to self determination and 
independence of East Timor' and empowers the 
Portuguese president and government to 
'perform all acts necessary for achieving the[se] 
aims' .5 Consequently, after Portugal became an 
EU member, the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers began to discuss East Timor. 
Between 1986 and June 1997, the European 
Parliament passed 16 resolutions on the territory, 
in response to particular incidents or as general 
statements of policy. 
The first clear signal that EU policymakers had 
begun to pay attention to East Timor came in 
September 1988, when the EU president (at the 
time the presidency was held by Germany), 
addressed the 43rd plenary session of the UN 
General Assembly. He spoke of the need for an 
acceptable international settlement in the territory. 
However, he did not refer to the right to self-
determination of the East Timorese people or to 
human rights. 
A European Parliament resolution of October 
1988 included 18 recommendations for action and 
a request to the Indonesian government to allow 
human rights organisations complete freedom 
within East Timor. It also called on the 
governments of all EU member states to halt the 
sale of military equipment to Indonesia until the 
illegal occupation is ended, and requested the 
Council to work towards a ceasefire in the 
territory so that a referendum could be held. 6 
Another motion, following Indonesian repression 
during a visit by Pope John Paul II to East Timor 
in 1989, referred to the 'genocide' being 
perpetrated by Indonesia in the territory.7 In 1991 
the Parliament again promoted the idea of a 
referendum on self-determination and requested 
that it be allowed to send a delegation to East 
Timor.8 
Unfortunately, the European Parliament has a 
very limited role in making EU policy. It was not 
until the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, 
when firm evidence of Indonesian oppression was 
broadcast on television screens the world over, 
that the EU issued a statement condemning 
Indonesia. 9 This did not translate into a 
consensual position within the United Nations, 
however. Attempts during Portugal's presidency 
of the EU in 1992 to get the 12 EU members to 
agree a submission for the UNCHR were stymied 
in Geneva by the United States which sought a 
more conciliatory approach.10 
In 1994 the Council of the EU issued a 
statement reaffirming the need for human rights 
to be observed if the 'efforts undertaken under 
the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-
General with a view to a just, lasting and 
internationally acceptable solution to the East 
Timor question' 11 were to be successful. It also 
called for international organisations to have free 
access to the territory. 
During 1994 and 1995, the European Parliament 
was particularly active on East Timor: four 
resolutions were passed and nine questions were 
asked. During this time the Commission's concern 
for East Timor was largely focused on the Asia 
Working Group, which was preparing the 
Common Position for eventual approval by the 
Council of Ministers. The Asia Working Group is 
made up of diplomatic officials from each of the 
member states and meets approximately once a 
month to work out the nuts and bolts of policy 
goals set out by the Council. It was within this 
group that competing or harmonious national 
interests were worked out in detail to achieve the 
consensus required for the Common Position. 
THE COMMON POSITION 
The Common Position can be viewed as a limiting 
document, where only the actions specified in it 
can be considered; or it can be viewed as an 
enabling document, one that provides a basic 
framework for many different policies or actions. 
Before attempting to assess it according to these 
alternatives, we must look at the significance of 
the Common Position itself. 
The Common Position asserts that East Timor is 
an international issue, implicitly rejecting 
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THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EU stnacture 
The EU has three significant institutions, the 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers 
(known as the Council), and the Parliament, 
each of which has its own interests, powers and 
functions. Their roles are not always smoothly 
coordinated and competition between them for 
authority and jurisdiction in particular areas 
does occur. To complicate matters further, the 
institutional and legal basis of the EU' s external 
relations is still somewhat in flux. 
In general, however, the European 
Commission has the power to make policy 
proposals. The ideas for these can come from 
the Commission itself, from the Council, from a 
court judgment or from other relevant groups 
such as national or EU-wide pressure groups. A 
proposal goes from the Commission to the 
Council of Ministers which has the power to 
enact and sign it. The Council is made up of 
representatives of members states (usually 
ministers for foreign affairs) and the presidency 
of the Council rotates among the member states 
every six months . The Council also consults the 
European Parliament whose members are 
directly elected by the citizens of member 
states. The Parliament may offer its opinion on 
any proposal and, in some cases, has the power 
to delay the legislature and propose 
amendments. The Council can ask the 
Commission to redraft proposals in line with 
Parliament's amendments. All proposals must 
rest on an article of the EU Treaty.12 
Although the Parliament now has some 
control over budgetary decisions and there is a 
procedure in place for stopping a proposal, it 
has little real influence over the policy process. 
This effective lack of accountability has 
implications for the EU's foreign policy agenda. 
The role of NVOs in EU policymaking must 
also be recognised. EU foreign policy is made 
by heads of states and they and their cabinet 
members are sensitive to public opinion and 
coordinated campaigns on issues of foreign 
policy. For example, in the early 1990s the East 
Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) 
ensured that East Timor became a priority 
foreign policy issue for the government during 
Ireland's tenure of the EU presidency in 
1995/96. 
first pillar where the Commission plays the most 
significant and powerful role. All other foreign 
and security policy decisions come under the 
second pillar - they remain intergovernmental 
and in these cases the power to devise and shape 
policy is still held by national governments. The 
distinction between these two pillars largely 
derives from the reluctance of member states to 
hand over aspects of national sovereignty to the 
collective community process. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) is a decision-making institution. The 
result of the Single European Act of 1986, the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Amsterdam 
of 1997, it was designed to provide a single 
European voice on foreign affairs. 13 Common 
Positions and Common Actions are devised 
from a consensual decision-making procedure, 
which means that those with the strongest 
positions compromise towards a more widely 
acceptable middle ground . The process of 
forming Common Positions inevitably produces 
the lowest common denominator. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam this year 
introduced changes to the CFSP designed to 
overcome the enormous difficulty of arriving 
at a consensus between 15 different states with 
different economic and political interests and 
different ethical concerns. While not rejecting 
the ideal of consensus, a 'constructive 
abstention procedure' which allows states to 
withdraw from implementing decisions 
without vetoing them, was adopted. On 'minor 
matters' decisions can be taken by qualified 
majority voting, where such matters are 
understood as specific aspects of an already 
agreed Common Position or Common Action. 
However, if any state objects for 'important 
and stated reasons of national policy' to a 
particular vote, the vote will not proceed 
unless the Council decrees, by unanimous 
vote, that it should. 14 In this way, the 
Amsterdam Treaty (which has not yet been 
ratified) both smoothes the way towards 
greater coordination of foreign policy and 
allows states an 'out' from policies which they 
do not support. 
As the Common Position on East Timor 
preceded the Amsterdam Treaty it is still 
unclear whether the new provisions allow 
states to opt out of implementing the policies 
on East Timor. It is possible, for instance, that a 
state which feels that a key national policy 
might be damaged by sanctions against 
Indonesia, might want to use the constructive 
abstention procedure and thus diminish the 
impact of a Common Action. 
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Indonesia' s claim that involvement by any other 
s tate is an infringement of sovereignty. The 
Common Position affirms tha t international 
human righ ts laws (such as the Universal 
Declaration on H uma n Rights) act as a 
counterweight to the national law of Indonesia 
an d the occup ied territory. Article 2.4 of the 
Common Position calls on the Indonesian 
government to implement relevant decisions 
a d op ted b y the UNCHR and supports the 
longs tanding UN-sponsored talks between 
Indonesia and Portugal and the All-inclusive Intra 
East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). 
Article 2.5 specifically commits aid resources to 
strengthen human rights in the territory. Its 
wording is important: it says the function of aid is 
both to improve the conditions of the people on 
the ground (in other words provide humanitarian 
aid for material conditions) and to strengthen 
respect for human rights in the territory. The 
focus on aid' s potential to improve human rights 
is echoed throughout the Common Position. 
However, the Common Position makes no 
specific reference to self-determination. Article 1.1 
refers to the 'legitimate aspirations' of the 
Timorese people, a vaguer notion which may or 
may not refer to the political status of the 
territory. Given that the United Nations had 
declared the occupation illegal under 
international law and that the Common Position 
reasserts its support for UN involvement in the 
region, and given that all EU statements on East 
Timor have been framed by the notion that 
Indonesian rule is illegal, this anomaly is difficult 
to explain. It could be that EU members were 
anxious not to provoke an angry response from 
the Indonesians by explicitly referring to self-
determina tion . In addition, four of the five 
policies which the Common Position refers to deal 
with initiatives which already exist under the 
aegis of the United Nations. Only the proposed 
aid package offers anything that does not suggest 
the EU is deferring to the United Nations as the 
lead agency for bringing change and exerting 
pressure on the Indonesian government. 
It is certainly important that the European 
Union supports UN initiatives on East Timor -
the more coordinated the international 
community is the more powerful its impact can 
be. But the importance of the European Union as 
a single voice cannot be underestimated, 
especially as there is a growing relationship 
between the EU and the ASEAN, in which 
Indonesia is a key actor. In the early 1990s the 
EU' s aid policy towards the Asian region shifted 
from one based on development cooperation to 
one based on economic cooperation, and 
diplomatic initiatives on democratisation and 
human rights shifted from confrontation to 
'constructive engagement'. 15 This shift is best 
understood in terms of dominant norms in 
international relations where trade is seen as the 
engine of economic development and the best 
guarantee of promoting democratisation, civic 
freedoms and global stability. 
Although all EU member states are obliged to 
comply with the decision-making procedure of 
the CFSP, bilateral relations between any member 
state and Indonesia are not precluded. Because 
the CFSP is still intergovernmental, individual 
member states may decide to go it alone, taking 
unilateral action against, or indeed in support of, 
Indonesia . As is clear from the arms trade16 or 
from Portugal's role in the UN talks, the thrust 
towards coordination does not prevent member 
states from carving out individual relationships 
with Indonesia. The relevant article in the 
Maastricht Treaty obliges member states to ensure 
that their national policies 'conform' to the 
Common Position.17 
Ironically perhaps, the relative vagueness of the 
Common Position on East Timor makes it a 
potentially powerful document. For example, 
although it does not spell out the goal of 
establishing a human rights monitoring unit in 
East Timor, its general commitment to 
strengthening human rights would not preclude a 
member state from seeking to promote such a 
policy within the EU. In this way member 
governments and civil society groups could use 
the Common Position on East Timor to great 
effect. 
Over the next year, the policies of the UK will 
provide a test case for the ability of EU member 
states to implement the spirit of the Common 
Position through a more active national policy. 
Attention will be focused on the UK, not just 
because of new Labour's commitment to 
changing its policies on Indonesia, but also 
because the UK presidency of the EU begins in 
January 1998. The UK government has agreed to 
tighten the criteria for arms exports to prevent 
weapons being sold which might be used for 
internal repression or external aggression, and to 
shift the emphasis of its aid policies from 
promoting trade to promoting human rights. At 
meetings with the Nobel peace prize winners, 
Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, 
foreign secretary Robin Cook also pledged that 
the UK would continue to support UN-mediated 
efforts to negotiate a settlement within East 
Timor.18 The arrival at the Council of Ministers of 
a government concerned for East Timor will 
significantly boost the Portuguese government's 
initiatives within the EU. 
IMPLEMENTING THE COMMON POSITION 
EU states have been slow to implement the Common 
Position, and any efforts to do so have lacked trans-
parency. Portugal was the main proponent of action 
in the months immediately after the adoption of the 
Common Position, proposing in October 1996 that 
moves be made on two fronts: delivering aid and 
improving the human rights situation. 
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However, in April 1997, 10 months after the 
Common Position was agreed, Christine Oddy (a 
UK MEP of the Socialist Group) was told that no 
decision had yet been taken by the European 
Commission about how to implement the Common 
Position. Commissioner Manuel Marin, said that 'all 
possible means for assisting the development of the 
people of East Timor, particularly in the fields of 
health, sanitation and education' were being 
explored. 19 The Commission has issued no other 
public statements. 
There are three policy areas to consider: the aid 
package, the commitment to strengthen human 
rights, and the EU' s support for UN peacemaking 
, activities. The fraught issue of coherence - whether 
the policies of national governments 'cohere' with 
the general principles of the Common Position - is 
also important. 
1. Aid 
On the basis of the 27 November 1996 Council 
decision, the Commission decided to launch a 6 
million ECU aid package over three years for health, 
sanitation and education. So far the International 
Committee of the Red Cross has received funding 
for a water and sanitation project. However, other 
NGOs are being consulted, including European-
based Catholic aid agencies. It is expected that further 
details of the package will be made public before the 
end of 1997. 
Preliminary assessment 
That the EU has decided to channel its funds through 
non-governmental agencies rather than through the 
Indonesian government is encouraging, as are the 
choices of priority areas. Health, education and 
sanitation are all crucial development needs. But the 
aid must be effective. International NGOs with a 
good track record on East Timor now need to monitor 
implementation while the European Union must 
continue to consult with legitimate representatives of 
the East Timorese people on priorities. 
Accountability procedures will also be important, 
given the European Union's dominance in the 
provision of aid. There is a potential clash between 
the institutional interests of the EU in ensuring clean 
and efficient delivery of aid and the interests of aid 
recipients and the NGOs delivering the programme. 
A detailed study of an aid programme undertaken by 
NGOs and the EU in Cambodia has shown that 
NGOs (both international and local) prefer small 
scale projects which take a long term view and are 
based on community development. The EU, on the 
other hand, prefers large scale projects which work 
through governments, use sophisticated technology, 
and have a short term 'rapid impact' .20 
Although in East Timor the European Union will 
not work through the Indonesian government, the 
research does suggest there are some difficulties 
inherent in implementing aid policies. NVOs 
monitoring the package are keen to see evidence of 
a gender based approach to project formulation, 
monitoring, assessment and evaluation. They will 
also be looking for a human rights implementation 
component within the aid package. Las tly, it is 
important that aid does not become an excuse for 
EU political inactivity on East Timor. 
2. Strengthening human rights 
To date there is no evidence that the European Union 
plans to implement policies arising from the 
Common Position which directly target human rights 
violations in the territory. However, EU members, 
led by the Dutch presidency, orchestrated an effective 
campaign to persuade a majority in the United 
Nations to support a strong condemnation of 
Indonesia's human rights record in East Timor at the 
UNCHR in April 1997.21 The vote was carried by a 
margin of seven, and although the UN resolution 
did not necessarily derive from the Common 
Position, it has been suggested that the agreement 
already reached in Europe made its adoption easier. 
Normally, the state under consideration at the 
UNCHR participates in informal negotiations 
before the vote, but in this case Indonesian repre-
sentatives chose not to. They were reported to be 
'furious' with the resolution, saying it was one-
sided and highly intrusive.22 Perhaps Indonesia 
underestimated the strength of opinion and failed 
to keep a significant number of key players on its 
side and in favour of the principle of sovereignty. 
The result was a serious blow to the Indonesian 
representatives at the UN. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the 
resolution must be viewed with caution until there is 
greater coherence between the trade, aid and financial 
policies adopted by individual UN members towards 
Indonesia.23 Although the motion is welcome, there 
is evidence that human rights violations in the 
territory have continued in 1997,24 and eye witnesses 
at the May 1997 elections claimed that not everything 
was entirely above board.25 
The effectiveness of UN declarations, when little 
action follows from its members at regional or global 
level, is open to question. 
3. Supporting UN talks 
Two series of talks have been running under the aegis 
of the UN, the tripartite talks between the UN and 
the governments of Indonesia and Portugal, and the 
AIETD. The latest round of the tripartite talks took 
place in New York from 4-7 August 1997 and were 
chaired by a special ambassador from the UN, 
Pakistani diplomat J amsheed Marker. The talks were 
unique in that they took place between officials (as 
opposed to politicians). Although no great break-
through took place, the shift to diplomat-based talks 
may be a sign of progress as it indicates that there is 
a possibility of real negotiations between Portugal 
and Indonesia. Similar procedural developments at 
the AIETD talks are also hopeful - there is to be greater 
participation from the Timorese side, with new rep-
resentatives of youth and women. 
Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor v 
Has the Common Position brought change in EU 
support for the talks? There is no evidence that the 
EU has provided any particular support for the talks. 
Although Portugal keeps its EU partners informed 
of progress, it is not clear if a more active part played 
by member states or the President would be welcomed 
by the Portuguese. Indeed, there is an apparent 
reluctance to establish another set of parallel or 
supporting structures which might diminish the focus 
on the tripartite talks. 
4. Coherence 
The Common Position has highlighted the issue of 
'coherence' between the values of the document and 
the trade, economic and diplomatic policies of 
individual member states. The difficulty is that there 
is little consistency between the policies of the EU and 
those of its individual member states, nor between 
the external relations developed by the European 
Union and the positions taken in the CFSP.26 This is not 
peculiar to the European Union's relations with 
Indonesia but is especially acute in this case because 
of the issue of sovereignty. Coherence is also a problem 
at the United Nations. 
According to the UN motion and the EU Common 
Position, EU member states do not accept the 
legitimacy of Indonesian rule in East Timor. Yet there 
is ample evidence that individual member states are 
trading weapons and providing military support 
which bolsters Indonesian rule in the territory.27 The 
same lack of 'coherence' can be seen between the EU' s 
condemnation of human rights abuses and the 
continued supply by its members of weapons which 
can be used to abuse human rights. Aside from the 
ethical aspects, the EU' s double standards undermine 
European involvement in the region in the eyes of 
Indonesia and other ASEAN nations. 
DISCUSSION 
The EU' s focus on implementing the aid package, and 
its neglect of the other dimensions of the Common 
Position, could suggest that the EU has taken a 
minimalist approach to that position. However, it 
could also reflect lack of coordination among EU insti-
tutions and the inherent slowness of the process of 
deciding on and enacting legislation. 
There does appear to be particular ambiguity about 
which pillar of the EU Treaty the aid package falls 
under. Is it entirely derivative of the Common Position 
and therefore within the remit of the CFSP (pillar two), 
subject entirely to the direction and control of national 
governments? Or is it entirely in the remit of economic 
cooperation (pillar one) and hence controlled by the 
Commission, specifically Commissioner Manuel 
Marin, who has responsibility for external affairs and 
development cooperation for parts of Asia and 
elsewhere? Perhaps all that can be said for certain is that 
design and implementation of the package is being 
negotiated through the office of Commissioner Marin, 
which implies that it is viewed as belonging to pillar 
one. However, the shape that the package takes _has 
implications for the EU's foreign policy, and particu-
larly for political relations between the EU and 
Indonesia. 
To date, the Common Position on East Timor has 
been regarded by the EU as largely a humanitarian 
policy, perhaps because the Commission office 
responsible for aid was instructed to devise the 
policies. However, the nature of EU-Indonesian 
relations may also play a part. Several officials have 
pointed out that the size of Indonesia's market, its 
importance in the ASEAN region, and its rejection of 
any attempt by the international community to 
intervene in what Indonesia insists are internal affairs, 
are significant factors. 
Nonetheless, in implementing the aid package 
the EU will be forced to confront the root of the 
problem within the territory - its illegal occupation 
by Indonesia. Aid may be a 'softer' option than 
taking a stand on human rights but Indonesia will 
have to be negotiated with or worked around. 
Workers will have to be placed within the territory 
and the impact of aid on the ground will have to be 
evaluated. In all of this, the EU will do its utmost 
not to be seen to be legitimising the illegal 
occupation. Thus the stated commitment of the EU 
to finding a solution which respects international 
law means that the politics of East Timor will have 
to be faced. NVOs, as a voice of civil society, can 
push for greater coherence between the aid 
package and the EU' s political and economic stance 
in the region, thereby ensuring that the sum total of 
EU activity arising from the Common Position is 
not a three-year aid programme. • 
Specific lobbying issues for NVOs 
1. Press for adequate monitoring and evaluation of 
the aid package, and for EU countries' bilateral aid 
to be harmonised with the EU Common Position. 
2. Insist that EU leaders demand Indonesia 
implements the 1997 UNCHR resolution. 
3. Continue to press for the permanent establishment 
of a human rights monitoring presence in East 
Tnnor. This could be facilitated through the UN or 
through the offices of the EU. 
4. Use the forthcoming Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
in London on 3-5 April 1998 as a focus for tactical 
lobbying on the Common Position. 
5. Highlight the lack of coherence between the EU 
member states' relationships with Indonesia, par-
ticularly in relation to the arms trade. The arms 
trade comes under the jurisdiction of the member 
states (not the Commission) and therefore decisions 
on it are accountable within the national politkal 
arena. EU governments should be pressed t.o emnn 
that no arms are sold to Indonesia in COldnllv.e., 
tion of the Common Position on B 
Members of the European Parliament SllOIJll,U• 
engaged through the Intergroup on 
and the Human RighlB Group 
6. Overall, the C o Poeli"i _.kfil•(IAflll· 
monimred~---~ ........ _,. .. llkl 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. EU aid package 
The European Commission should monitor and 
evaluate the aid package to ensure it improves the 
material situation of East Timorese people and 
strengthens respect for human rights. The aid 
package should not be an end in itself, but an 
instrument to help settle the conflict within East 
Timor. The broader perspective of the Common 
Position, and commitments given by the EU at the 
53rd session of the UNCHR, must be kept to the 
fore. Ultimately, the test of any policy is its impact 
on the ground. 
2. The UNCHR resolution 
As sponsors of the UN resolution, EU member states 
should ensure that the key recommendations are 
implemented. In particular, they should pursue 
their commitment to strengthening human rights in 
the territory before the 54th session of the UNCHR 
in April 1998, by seeking action on the recommen-
dations to: 
a) invite the special rapporteur on torture to visit 
EastTimor 
b) provide access for human rights organisations 
to East Timor 
c) ensure the early release of East Timorese people 
detained or convicted for political reasons. 
In addition, EU governments should bear in mind 
that these are only elements of a broader 
programme - on-site human rights monitoring 
might also be needed. 
3.Coherence 
EU member states should coordinate their aid and 
trade policies to ensure coherence around the 
Common Position. Bilateral aid programmes should 
be harmonised with those of the EU, and multilat-
eral aid programmes should be brought into line. 
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A shift in view 
At first glance the response of the 
Roman Catholic church in Portugal 
to the suffering of the East Timorese 
people appears less than adequate. But 
more is going on than meets the eye, 
says Reverend PAT SMYTHE. Changing 
circumstances in East Timor, and in 
Portugal itself, have encouraged 
vigorous and concerted action. 
Th e Portuguese Catholic church exercised a pastoral ministry in East 
Timor for several centuries, and was part of 
the colonial administrative structure. It 
even had a specific responsibility for 
educational provision in the territory. With 
such an intimate historical association with 
the country and its people, one would 
expect to find an ongoing concern for 
Timorese welfare within the church in 
Portugal today. 
It is perplexing, then, to discover that the 
Portuguese Bishops' Conference has made 
few official statements on the subject in the 
22 years since the Indonesian invasion and 
occupation . And only a handful of its 35 
bishops have been outspoken or active in 
trying to remedy the plight of the Timorese 
in their homeland, or of those who are 
refugees in Portugal. Bishops who have 
taken up the Timorese cause, most notably 
Dom Manuel Martins of Setubal, have acted 
with courage and persistence - but as 
individuals rather than in episcopal 
cooperation . There is no common church 
policy and the church offers no 'official' 
welcomes or ecclesiastical support to the 
many Timorese who have fled to Portugal 
to escape oppression. 
Limited response 
The response of the diocesan clergy has 
been similarly limited, and again what has 
been done is down to individuals acting 
alone. Their efforts, evident in parishes 
where Timorese refugees have come to live, 
consist largely of humanitarian assistance -
provision of food, clothing, domestic 
equipment, and some financial help. 
Timorese culture and identity have also 
been supported, through liturgical and 
social commemorations of certain public 
events in Timor (such as the anniversary of 
the Santa Cruz massacre) and celebrations 
of family occasions, such as baptisms and 
marriages. 
Overall, however, concern for the East 
Timorese political cause has been le ss 
apparent. One explanation for this seeming 
lack of solidarity can be found in Portugal's 
own political development since the crisis 
in East Timor erupted. Political debate and 
activity in Portugal were suppressed during 
the Salazar dictatorship ( 1930-68) . After the 
bloodless revolution by the Armed Forces 
Movement (MFA) in 1974 there was great 
turmoil, exacerbated by tensions in 
Portugal's African colonies and the arrival 
of huge numbers of refugees fleeing those 
conflicts. A leftward trend within the MFA 
and the rise of the Portuguese Communist 
Party, and pressing domestic concerns -
political instability, widespread poverty, and 
a sense of lagging behind the rest of 
Europe in economic and social 
development - occupied the thoughts and 
activity of the church, among others. East 
Timor was far away, and (compared to the 
African wars of liberation) seemed passive. 
Moreover, information about the 
situation in East Timor was inadequate and 
distorted . The Indonesian regime's 
isolation of the territory and the church's 
own traditional opposition to Marxist 
ideology meant the depiction of Fretilin 
and the East Timorese resistance as 
'communist inspired' was too readily 
accepted. No doubt the political priorities 
of Portugal's western allies also fostered 
such an interpretation. Meanwhile , the 
Vatican's concern to protect the church in 
Indonesia meant restraints were put on 
those like Dom Manuel who sought to raise 
concern for Timorese welfare and support 
for an authentic plebiscite on the country's 
political status. 
Bishop Aloysius Soma 
R ls wllll sadness that we record the 
,...of Bishop Aloysius Nobuo Soma, 
ll§lllOPlnterftus of Nagoya, Japan, on 
·-**"''· $oJna was the bishop in charge of 
1 1m~r·?ea.tt in Japan. He was a great ~ East nmorese, having visite<l 
--~·.-_-9"h9r of. o.ccasions. As 
~rQi~ll~;~· ~-· · ·--~ Pacific 
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Coalition on East Timor (APCET), he 
attended both the conference held in Manila 
in 1994 and the second which was broken up 
in Malaysia in 1996. His unforgettable words 
to those gathered at mass during the APCET 
I conference in 1994 serve as an inspiration 
to all those activists engaged in bringing the 
suffering of East Timorese to the attention of 
decision makers around the world. 
CHURCHES 
Dramatic change 
But th e Cold War is over, Portugal has 
joined the European Union, global 
communications have expanded, and 
international recognition of the East Timor 
issue has grown. All this, together with such 
events as the Dili massacre and the Nobel 
peace prize award to Bishop Carlos Belo 
and Jose Ramos-Horta, has dramatically 
affected the way the church, and the nation , 
perceive and respond to the situation. More 
is being thought, said, and done for the East 
Timorese than ever before. 
Within the community of the church 
there is now an increased commitment on 
the part of many to promote the 'just, 
comprehensive, and internationally 
acceptable solution' proposed by the United 
Nations. Dom J anuario dos Reis Torgal, 
auxi liary bishop in Lisbon , takes every 
opportunity to urge greater attention for 
the Timorese cause and lay communities 
have become more concerned and active, 
with or without the active support of the 
clergy. 
Some Catholic laity and other Christians 
have been active in the various NGOs (such 
as CDPM and A Paz e Possivel) which have 
formed in Portugal to defend East Timorese 
identity or provide welfare help. Most of the 
faithful knew little of the suffering of the East 
Timorese people, or of the need for action 
on their behalf, until the television report of 
the massacre in Dili cemetery in 1991. But 
since then the 'family of faith' - and indeed 
the nation as a whole - has taken the East 
Timorese plight much more to heart. 
Humanitarian aid and educational 
supplies now reach the territory, detailed 
and reliable information on human rights 
vio lations is regularly communicated, and 
the East Timorese cause is promoted in the 
corridors of diplomacy. Above all , personnel 
from the Portuguese Catholic church -
clergy, religious and laity - have served and 
still serve the many needs of the Timorese 
people.• 
'Blessed are those who work for justice. The 
people of East Timor are working for justice 
and they are blessed. [ ... ] God is raising up 
people everywhere to walk alongside the East 
Timorese [ ... ] In 1989 Bishop Belo wrote that 
the world has forgotten East Timor. Let us 
show that it is not true.' 
Bishop Soma will be remembered with great 
affection. May he rest in peace. • 
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INTERVIEW: JOSE RAMOS-HORTA 
Steps on the 
road to peace 
In July, Jose Ramos-Horta, special 
representative of the East Timorese in 
exile, met Britain's foreign secretary, 
Robin Cook, and stressed the urgent 
need to improve human rights in the 
territory. He told Timar Link why he is 
more hopeful than ever of an end to the 
suffering. 
Horta began b\' reiterating his belief that the peace plan put forward by the National 
Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 
1992 still provides the only feasible solution to 
the deadlock over East Timor. Timar Link asked 
him to outline the peace plan. 
JR-H: The peace plan has three phases. Phase 
one I call the humanitarian phase whereby there 
would be a cessation of torture and a permanent 
UN presence to monitor the situation. Phase 
two, lasting about five years, would be what we 
call the autonomy phase, which calls for limited 
autonomy based on total demilitarisation of the 
territory, improvements in the human rights 
situation, and the election of a local assembly. 
The third phase, which could start six, seven or 
10 years from now - the time frame is not 
definite because it is a matter for negotiation -
would be when we decide the legal status of the 
territory through a referendum under UN 
supervision. 
My basic proposition is that we should leave 
aside for some years the most complex issue, 
that is, the legal status of the territory. For 
Indonesia, East Timor is already an internal 
affair - it is part and parcel of the Indonesian 
Republic. For us, East Timor is a non se lf-
governing territory under UN responsibility 
and Portuguese administration. We are at 
opposite ends of the legal spectrum. So my 
proposal is that we put off any discussion on 
this because we will neYer agree, and negotia-
tions will never start if we begin from that most 
difficult point. 
What we should address are the most pressing 
human rights and humanitarian problems that 
affect the daily lives of the people of East Timor, 
and address some of the root causes of the 
unhappiness and resentment in the territory: 
jobs, unemployment, transmigration, land 
issues, propern·.justice. If we can tackle these -
which would also be in the best interests of the 
Indonesians, because it will give them a better 
image - then we would create a better climate 
in which to address this issue [i.e. legal status] 
in a few vears' time. 
It is HT\' similar to the Israeli-Palestinian 
interim agreement. Of course, ,,.e cannot talk 
about exact models, but it is same basic 
approach, a step-by-step resolution of a conflict. 
TL: \\'hat part do rnu see the UK government 
playing in the resolution of the East Timor 
question? 
JR-H: I am Yen happy with the change of 
government. There seems to be a real 
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commitment to be more positive, and genuine 
interest on the part of Robin Cook to support 
the efforts of Portugal and the United Nations. 
The UK is, as we know, a major player in the 
European l'nion. In the past it was the major 
stumbling block to am initiative on East Timor 
in the European Union and in the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva; and 
it is the biggest arms supplier today to Indonesia. 
From an ethical, moral, and strategic point of 
view I think it is in the best interests of the UK 
to observe a \'erv serious code of conduct in 
arms policies. 
The UK can also play a much more active 
and constructiYe role in mobilising the 
European Union to support the negotiations 
under UN auspices. It can also be effective, if 
it takes a stand on East Timor, in pushing 
the United States, Canada and Australia. • 
The shock of 
the real 
Human Rights Violations in East Timar, 
ETISC 
This brochure aims to shock. It succeeds. The particularly brutal violations which 
have been going on in East Timor since 
the Indonesian invasion in 1975 are no 
longer news to some of us. Reams of 
reports from reputable human rights 
organisations, such as Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch, have 
been distributed over the years, describing 
in macabre detail the torture practices of 
the Indon esian army. Governments know 
about them but do little. It took Max 
Stahl's television footage and Steve Cox's 
photographs of the Santa Cruz massacre in 
November 1991, to shake those in power 
out of their apathy and bring home the 
harsh reality behind those reports. The 
images have lasted, and have added 
impetu s to the growing campaign for 
justice in East Timor. 
Human Rights Violations in East Timor details 
the main types of torture used in the territory 
- electric shocks, burning, immersion in 
:l':. 
in East Timor 
water, beatings, rape and other forms of 
sexual abuse, the removal of nails, the 
mutilation of toes, and so on. The aim of such 
practices, over and above the quest for 
information on the resistance networks, is to 
instil fear. It works. 
The black-and-white and colour 
photographs have been passed to human 
rights organisations working outside East 
Timor and, by various routes, have made it 
into the public domain . Some were taken 
by relatives of the victims, others probably 
by the violators themselves or East 
Timorese compelled to take part. They 
depict both torture and the results of 
torture - beaten, bruised and blindfolded 
bodies showing various degrees of 
mutilation. They chronicle events from the 
early 1980s to the present day. 
The photographs are hardhitting. But as 
the book states in its introduction, unlike 
horror movies and TV violence, this is 
happening for real, to people like us, every 
day. And it has to stop. Pressure must be put 
on the Indonesian regime to implement the 
demands spelt out by this year's UN 
Commission on Human Rights and listed in 
the conclusion to this book. More pressure 
is needed than governments around the world 
have so far been willing to exert. 
Human Rights Violations in East Timor is 
published by East Timor International 
Support Centre, Darwin. It is available from 
the Australia East Timor Association, 
Melbourne, Australia, PO Box 93, Fitzroy, 
VICTORIA, 3065, AUSTRALIA. Fax: + 61 3 
94162746. Email: aetamel@peg.apc.org. • 
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